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RECENT DECISIONS
Illegal Procedure-The Rozelle Rule Violates The Sherman
Antitrust Act-The trial of John Mackey v. National Football
League' began on February 3, 1975 and ran fifty-five days.
Sixty-eight persons testified. The court, sitting without a jury,
considered 400 exhibits and the transcript covered 11,000
pages. Six months after the trial ended, Judge Earl R. Larson
filed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of
Judgment. His conclusion was another blow to the player allo-
cation system in the NFL: the Rozelle Rule violated the anti-
trust laws.
The plaintiffs were fifteen present and former players in the
NFL. Six' were seeking injunctive relief against the use of the
Rozelle Rule. The other nine3 were seeking monetary damages.
The defendants were the NFL, an unincorporated association
of professional football teams, Mr. Alvin Rozelle, individually
and as Commissioner of the NFL, and each of the twenty-six
member teams of the NFL.
The issues, as stated by the court, were clear. The plaintiffs
alleged that the Rozelle Rule constituted a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.4 In the alternative, the
plaintiffs alleged that if the Rule was not such a per se viola-
tion, then it was illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
In either event, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and dam-
ages. The defendants alleged that there was no per se violation,
no unreasonable restraint of trade, and therefore no antitrust
violation. Defendants further claimed that they were immune
from the operation of the antitrust laws under the labor exemp-
tion, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction as exclusive
jurisdiction was in the National Labor Relations Board.' With
the issues so framed, and pursuant to an order that postponed
any consideration of damages until liability under the antitrust
laws had been decided, the case went to trial.
1. No. 4-72-Civil 277 (D. Minn. 1975) [hereinafter Mackey].
2. Kermit Alexander, Kenneth Bowman, William Curry, Thomas Keating, John
Mackey and Alan Page.
3. Olie Austin, Marlin Briscoe, Richard Gordon, John Henderson, Clint Jones,
Gene Washington, Charles West, John Williams and Nate Wright.
4. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
5. Mackey at 2.
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The court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order of Judgment were presented in outline form.' In the first
paragraph the court resolved a threshold issue by concluding
that "[t]he business of professional football is subject to the
antitrust laws, ' 7 citing Radovich v. National Football League.I
In Radovich the Supreme Court ruled that the two cases9 that
gave the antitrust exemption to baseball were applicable to
baseball only and not to all team sports as the trial court and
Court of Appeals had found. Once the exemption was so lim-
ited, the finding that professional football was covered by the
antitrust laws followed easily.
Having disposed of that preliminary issue, and as part of
the Findings of Fact, the court embarked on a discussion of
what the Rozelle Rule actually is and what restrictive and anti-
competitive effects it has. The Rule states that:
[a]ny player, whose contract with a League club has ex-
pired, shall thereupon become a free agent and shall no longer
be considered a member of the team of that club following the
expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player, becom-
ing a free agent in such manner, thereafter signed a contract
with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually
satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the
two League clubs, the Commissioner may name and then
award to the former club one or more players, from the Ac-
tive, Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection
choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole
discretion deems fair and equitable; any such decision by the
Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.'"
The Rule was unilaterally adopted by the teams of the NFL as
an amendment to its Constitution and By-Laws in 1963." It is
binding on each team in the NFL by virtue of its inclusion in
the Constitution and By-Laws. From the adoption of the Rule
6. Due to the outline form of the court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order for Judgment, the specific reasoning that the court used in arriving at its
conclusions is not stated. Throughout the text, statements by the court are indicated.
Substantial parts of the background and analysis are the author's own based on re-
search and reasoning.
7. Mackey. 1.1 at 3.
8. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
9. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
10. NFL Constitution and By-Laws, 1975 § 12.1(H).
11. Mackey, 2.3 at 4.
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in 1963 until the end of this trial, the Commissioner had used
the Rule four times to award compensation.'"
The conflict surrounding this Rule becomes clear when its
operation is compared to the policies and purposes of the anti-
trust laws. The basic purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act is
to promote free and open competition.'3 The basic purpose of
the Rule is to restrict competition among the NFL teams for
the services of professional football players. The Rule makes it
impossible for a player whose contract has expired to sell his
services in a free and open marketplace. Teams are under-
standably reluctant to sign a free agent when they do not know
what will be demanded of them in compensation to the player's
former team. A player who desires to switch teams must con-
vince the team that he wishes to play for that he is worth both
the salary he is demanding and whatever the Commissioner, if
the teams themselves cannot agree, decides is adequate com-
pensation to his former team. The net result is that the player's
ability to get competitive bids for his services is severely re-
strained.
The court cited the Dick Gordon incident as a classic exam-
ple of the dampening effect the Rule has on negotiations be-
tween teams and free agents." Gordon completed his contract
duties to the Chicago Bears and became a free agent in 1972.
Several teams wanted to sign him, but none could agree with
the Bears on mutually satisfactory compensation. As a result,
no team had signed Gordon well into the 1972 season.
Commissioner Rozelle then publicly announced, in advance of
any signing, what compensation he would require any team
signing Gordon to give the Bears: one first round draft choice
for the draft following the 1973 season. The Commissioner's
12. In 1967, Pat Fisher went from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Washington
Redskins. St. Louis was compensated with a second round draft choice in the 1969
draft and a third round choice in the 1970 draft. In 1967, David Parks went from the
San Francisco 49ers to the New Orleans Saints. San Francisco was compensated by
being awarded Kevin Hardy, New Orleans first round draft choice in the completed
1968 draft, and New Orleans' first round choice in the upcoming 1969 draft. In 1972,
Phil Olson went from the New England Patriots to the Los Angeles Rams. New Eng-
land was compensated by the Rams' first and third round draft choices in the 1972
draft and $35,000 in cash. In 1972, Dick Gordon went from the Chicago Bears to the
Los Angeles Rams. Chicago was compensated by the Rams' first round draft choice in
the draft following the 1973 season.
13. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
14. Mackey, " 2.7.4 at 5.
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announcement removed from Gordon's contract negotiations
the albatross of the unknown compensation award, and Gordon
was signed by the Los Angeles Rams "immediately there-
after." 5
The court then directed its attention to the question of
whether this Rule is an antitrust violation. Alleged anticompe-
titive conduct can be determined to be an antitrust violation
under either of two tests. The conduct is either a per se viola-
tion or it violates the rule of reason. Per se violations are those
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore ille-
gal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use."
A group boycott, which was alleged in this case, is a per se
violation. 7 In contrast to a rule of reason analysis, proof of a
per se violation is directed toward establishing existence of the
prohibited conduct and not toward an examination of the ef-
fects that the conduct has on the market. If the conduct com-
plained of is not a per se violation, then the issue becomes
whether the conduct is an unreasonable restraint of trade.
While it was specifically the Rozelle Rule that was under
attack, the court stated that
[a] better understanding of the Rozelle Rule requires analy-
sis of other anticompetitive rules and practices of the defen-
dants. These rules . . . impose severe hardships on a player
prior to his ever becoming a free agent and deter players from
playing out the option and achieving that status. 8
The court considered four other rules: the draft, the standard
player contract, the option clause, and the tampering rule.
The first restrictive practice, the player draft, is a process
through which virtually all players qualified to play in the NFL
are assigned to the various teams. The drafting team has "the
exclusive right to negotiate for the services of each player
selected by it."'" No other team may negotiate with a drafted
15. Id.
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
17. Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
18. Mackey, 3.1 at 5.
19. NFL Constitution and By-Laws, 1975, § 14.5.
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player without the consent of the drafting team. Through the
draft, NFL teams, in concert, deny the player the "opportunity
to negotiate with clubs other than the one club that drafted
him. ' 2 No competitive bidding for players is allowed. Should
a player be unwilling to play for the team with his draft rights,
or should he be unwilling to accept the contract terms offered,
he is "effectively boycotted or blacklisted ' 2 by the others.
The second restriction is that no team is allowed to employ
a player who has not signed a standard player contract. While
some modifications are allowed in the terms of this contract,
none are allowed that would open a player's services to free
competition, and the Commissioner has the right to veto all
changes in the contract proposed by the individual team and
player.2 2 Under the terms of the contract, the player agrees to
comply with and be bound by the NFL Constitution and By-
Laws (including the Rozelle Rule) 23 and to allow the club to
unilaterally extend the standard contract for one year under
the option clause. 24
The option clause was the third restrictive rule and practice
considered. This clause21 permits NFL teams to exert pressure
on a player to stay with his present team in two ways. First,
once a player decides that he wants to leave his present team,
the team, knowing his wishes, can force him to remain one year
beyond the contract term. During this year, the player risks
injury, poor performance, and possible informal discipline by
disapproving coaches and owners, any of which could substan-
tially reduce his value to another team. Secondly, while run-
20. Mackey, 3.2.2 at 5.
21. Id., 3.2.2 at 6.
22. NFL Constitution and By-Laws, 1975, § 15.1.
23. Standard Player Contract for the National Football League, 2, 4.
24. Id. at 10.
25. The option clause reads in full:
The Club may, by sending notice in writing to the Player, on or before the first
day of May following the football season referred to in 1 hereof, renew this
contract for a further term of one (1) year on the same terms as are provided by
this contract, except that (1) the Club may fix the rate of compensation to be
paid by the Club to the Player during said further term, which rate of compensa-
tion shall not be less than ninety percent (90%) of he sum set forth in T 3 hereof
and shall be payable in installments during the football season in such further
term as provided in 3; and (2) after such renewal this contract shall not include
a further option to the Club to renew the contract. The phrase "rate of compen-
sation" as above used shall not include bonus payments or payments of any
nature whatsoever and shall be limited to the precise sum set forth in T 3 hereof.
[Vol. 59
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ning the gauntlet of the option year, hoping that he emerges at
the other end with his football value sufficiently intact to bar-
gain effectively with other teams, the player takes a ten percent
cut in pay. These two pressures, imposed by the team on its
players, tend to force players to remain on their respective
teams and restrict free competition for players.
The fourth restriction considered by the court was the
tampering rule. 26 This rule forbids any team to negotiate with
any player under contract to any other team. Violators can be
fined or denied draft choices. To understand the extent of the
restriction this rule imposes, it is important to realize that the
term of the standard player contract is from the date of execu-
tion until May 1 following the last season covered.27 Therefore,
even though the season for most teams ends in December, and
all teams have completed play by mid-January, no contract
negotiations are permitted for about four months. By May 1,
only three months remain until the beginning of summer
camps for a player to complete all his contract negotiations
with a new team. The effect of this short negotiation period is
to tend to force players to remain with their present teams.
So the web is complete. When a player leaves college, no
team will negotiate with him other than the team that drafts
him. No other team will negotiate with him while he is under
contract to any other team. When his contract term is up, his
team can unilaterally extend it for one more year at a ten
percent cut in pay. If he does play the option year, no team will
negotiate with him until the following May 1. When teams can
negotiate with him, they are reluctant to sign him and risk the
unknown compensation award. Thus his ultimate choice
usually is either "re-signing with his former club or not playing
football. ,28
The court found that the operation of this system restricted
the number of clubs that were willing to sign free agent players.
The Rule created the anomalous situation that "[t]he player's
former club, even though it no longer has any contractual rights
to the player, in fact does have rights to the player by reason
of the Rozelle Rule, and can and does demand and receive
26. NFL Constitution and By-Laws, 1975, § 9.2.
27. Standard Players Contract for the National Football League, 1.
28. Mackey, 4.5 at 7.
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
equal compensation for him."29 The Rule "substantially re-
stricts players' freedom of movement, . . . substantially de-
creases players' bargaining power in contract negotiations" and
denies the player the right to "sell his services in a free and
open market."3 (Paragraph numbering omitted). "As a result,
salaries paid by each club are lower than if competitive bidding
were allowed," there is reduced "interstate commerce of play-
ers" and the "NFL and each club unlawfully benefit from the
existence' '3 of the Rule. (Paragraph numbering omitted).
Based on the above data, the court concluded that the Roz-
elle Rule is a per se violation of the antitrust laws as a con-
certed refusal to deal and a group boycott.3 2 The court's conclu-
sion is based on Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
Federal Trade Commission,33 [hereinafter cited as FOGA],
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 31 and United States v.
General Motors.3 5 Once the Rule was found to be a per se viola-
tion, evidence the NFL had presented to show the reasonable-
ness of the Rule in the factual context in which it operated
became unimportant. Under all circumstances, the Rozelle
Rule is illegal.
In this writer's opinion, the court's conclusion that a group
boycott existed is erroneous. The cited cases were examples of
group boycotts arising in two distinct factual situations. In
FOGA and General Motors, the terms of the agreements among
the conspirators were that the group would allow no dealing
whatsoever with the group that had earned their disfavor. In
Klor's, instead of totally refusing to deal, the group agreed to
deal but only on terms so discriminatory that the end result
was the same as a total refusal. As will be shown below, neither
of these factual patterns existed in this case and the finding of
a group boycott was therefore improper.
In FOGA, the Guild was an organization representing de-
signers, manufacturers, sellers and distributors of women's
dresses. The Guild's dresses were original and distinctive and
it was from this characteristic that they derived a great deal of
29. Id., 4.7 at 8.
30. Id., 4.11, 4.12 and 4.12.2 at 8.
31. Id., 4.12.3, 4.13, 4.15 at 9.
32. Id., 5.1 at 9.
33. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
34. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
35. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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their value. Because these designs were not protected by pat-
ents or copyrights, upon entering the stream of commerce they
were copied by other manufacturers and sold at lower prices
thus undercutting demand for the Guild dresses. To combat
this style piracy, the members of the Guild agreed that they
would not sell their dresses to any retailer who also sold copies.
Due to the size and power of the Guild and the demand for their
dresses, 12,000 retailers nationally agreed with the Guild to
boycott the copiers. In a suit brought by the FTC, the Supreme
Court found the Guild arrangement a group boycott and a per
se antitrust violation.
General Motors was factually analogous. In that case some
Chevrolet dealers were selling cars to discount houses which in
turn sold them to the public at prices that other Chevrolet
dealers could not match. These other dealers, injured by the
discount house competition, induced General Motors to force
any dealers supplying autos to the discounters to discontinue
doing so. As in FOGA, the result was a complete boycott of the
discounters by General Motors in an sttempt to "eliminate a
class of competitors by terminating business dealings"3 with
them. (emphasis aaded).
The Rozelle Rule, however, is factually distinguishable
from the Guild and General Motors boycotts. Besides being a
boycott by a seller, the Guild and General Motors both agreed
to deny all sales to the boycott target. There were no conditions
on the ban. The Rozelle Rule, on the other hand, operates
differently. NFL teams have not agreed to totally refuse to deal
with free agent players. As the court recognized, these teams
did negotiate with and sign free agents." These teams, instead
of boycotting free agent players by denying interteam move-
ment completely, as they have the power to do, chose only to
restrict such movement by requiring compensation to be paid
to the player's former team. Because the movement was re-
stricted and not denied, labeling the group's conduct a boycott
was unjustified. The court's conclusion was to find that teams,
while they are negotiating with and signing free agent players
were at the same time boycotting them. Because the Rozelle
Rule restraint is incomplete and conditional, FOGA and
36. Id. at 140.
37. E.g., Mackey, 11 2.7.1, 2.7.2, 2.7.3, 2.7.4 at 4-5.
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General Motors should not have been relied upon in this case.
The court's reliance on those cases led it to the improper con-
clusion that a boycott exists here.
Klor's is an example of a second type of group boycott cases.
Klor's, Inc. was a retailer of home appliances. Broadway-Hale,
located next door, was one of a chain of stores selling the same
appliances. Klor's alleged that Broadway-Hale and ten manu-
facturers of the appliances that Klor's needed in its trade con-
spired "either not to sell to Klor's or to sell to it only at discrim-
inatory prices and highly unfavorable terms." 8 As a result,
Klor's was completely foreclosed from selling the appliances of
the ten manufacturers involved and its business suffered. The
Supreme Court, hearing the case on an appeal from a summary
judgment granted the defendants, ruled that the facts dis-
closed a boycott and the .case was remanded for trial.
The Klor's case presents an example of a boycott which was
total in effect while nominally allowing goods to flow to the
target. Klor's was not precluded from dealing with the ten
manufacturers by the terms of the agreement among the con-
spirators. However, the conditions under which it was forced to
deal were such that no reasonable businessman could accept
them and remain in business. As a result, Klor's was driven
"out of business as a dealer in the defendant's products."39
Similar distinctions exist between Klor's and the Rozelle
Rule as existed between FOGA and General Motors and the
Rule. While Broadway-Hale took a more subtle approach than
did the Guild, the intent and the effect in both cases was to
completely stop dealings between the group and the target.
One chose to do so directly, the other indirectly, but the single
unifying thread between these cases is the total end of business
intercourse between group members and the boycott target.
The Rozelle Rule is cut from a different mold. It is in the
nature of a "conditional" boycott. NFL teams will not sign free
agent players formerly under contract to other teams unless
compensation is paid. This restriction, conditional in nature,
is fundamentally different from the total boycotts in the cases
cited by the court. It is not a Klor's-type boycott where the
conditions that all NFL teams place on negotiations with free
38. 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1958).
39. Id. at 213.
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agent players are so restrictive that no player can play the
option year, become a free agent and sign with another team.
While it could be argued with some force that it is a boycott
for average and below average players who are unable to induce
new teams to risk unknown compensation, the court chose not
to use that approach. By ruling that the Rule in toto was a
boycott, after recognizing that some players do in fact move
from one team to another, the court weakened its boycott anal-
ysis. Nor should the implications of labeling conduct a per se
violation be taken lightly. It declares conduct illegal that in
some situations may be desirable or at least be without serious
adverse effects. Indeed, both cases"0 and commentators4' have
recently argued that the group boycott should not in all instan-
ces be considered a per se violation. In such a context, the court
should not have extended the language of the complete boy-
cotts in FOGA, General Motors and Klor's to the "conditional"
boycott represented by the Rozelle Rule. Under the above anal-
ysis it is clear that although the Rule is a restriction on the
ability of a player to sell his services in a freely competitive
market, it is not a per se violation as a group boycott.
There is also case law supporting the proposition that due
to the unique nature of professional league sports, the per se
rules should never be applied to them.42 These cases concluded
that the continued existence of professional sports leagues logi-
cally requires that some competitive balance among the indi-
vidual teams be maintained. Kapp v. National Football
League 3 dealt with an attack on many of the same NFL rules
considered in this case. The court concluded that the legality
of the rules should be determined by the use of the rule of
reason for two reasons. First, they considered the singular posi-
tion of league sports and their need for competitive balance, as
noted above. Second, they noted that player-league relations
are particularly susceptible to collective bargaining and that
[a]pplication of the absolute per se rule to all league rules
enforcing restrictions upon the players' free choice of employ-
40. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062, rehearing denied 397 U.S. 1003 (1970).
41. 48 TEMP. L. Q. 126 (1975).
42. E.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
43. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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ment tends to preclude collective bargaining negotiations for
league enforcement of some rules in this category which, con-
sidering the unique nature and purpose of league sports, may
be regarded by both players and clubs as reasonably neces-
sary in furtherance of their long-range mutual interests.4
These cases were not relied upon in the Mickey decision proba-
bly because the court was not impressed with either the effect
of the Rozelle Rule on the competitive balance or the effective-
ness of league-player collective bargaining. Other courts have,
however, found these factors to be sufficient reasons to forego
the per se analysis and confine themselves to the rule of reason
in determining legality of these player restrictions.
Having "specifically found that the Rozelle Rule consti-
tuted a per se violation of the antitrust laws,"45 the court also
concluded that it is "invalid under the Rule of Reason stan-
dard."46 The court may have entered this discussion to provide
the basis for an appellate court to conclude that the Rozelle
Rule is illegal, should it not accept the per se argument. Ac-
tually, no discussion of this evidence was needed. A conclusion
that an activity is a per se violation means that it is so perni-
cious that no adequate justification can be given for its use. It
is per se unreasonable and an additional independent finding
of unreasonableness is not needed.47
Rule of reason analysis, by way of introduction, is signifi-
cantly different from per se considerations. Per se analysis is
complete once conduct of specified types is determined to exist.
No consideration of the effects of this conduct on the relevant
market is needed. Under the rule of reason, however, these
effects are critical and the legality or illegality of alleged anti-
competitive activity is determined by considering its effects on
the relevant market and the business reasons presented for its
use. Some restrictive agreements, although they eliminate
competition between the parties, may strengthen competition
in the market place. Short term restrictions in competition
may have beneficial long term consequences.4 8 In sum, if it can
44. Id. at 81-82.
45. Mackey, 6.1 at 9.
46. Id., 6.2 at 9.
47. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
48. 1 M. HANDLER, TwENTY-FIvE YEARs OF ANTITRUST 45 (1973).
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be shown that the conduct, allegedly anticompetitive, is based
on understandable business requirements, that there is no spe-
cific intent to accomplish forbidden restraints and that there
has been no diminution in the strength of market competition,
then the conduct is not an unreasonable restraint of trade, does
not violate the rule of reason and is not illegal.49
In applying these considerations to a particular case, there
is no single test to determine when an unreasonable restraint
of trade is adequately demonstrated. There is, however, con-
sensus on some of the factors to be considered. In Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question, the court must or-
dinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual and probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, all are
relevant facts."
The gist of the rule of reason analysis is the effect that the
restraint has on the area of the economy within which it oper-
ates and whether its use can be justified in that context.
The Mackey court's rule of reason analysis was divided into
two parts. The court first stated its reasons for finding the
Rozelle Rule unreasonable. It then considered the arguments
presented by the NFL designed to show that the Rozelle Rule,
in the context of professional football, is not unreasonable.
The court first found the Rule unreasonable due to its
overly broad application.51 The evidence indicated that the
NFL created the restriction because it feared the effects of
movement from team to team of the best players in the league.
Little or no concern was expressed regarding the movement of
players of average or below average ability. The Rule, however,
applies to all players equally. It covers players whose move-
49. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
50. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
51. Mackey, 6.2.1 at 9.
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ment would in no way endanger the goals that the Rule was
designed to protect. As such, the court concluded, it is over-
broad and unreasonable.
The second reason for finding the restraint unreasonable
was "that there are no procedural safeguards whatsoever with
respect to its employment."52 The Rule may be a crucial factor
in determining a player's employer. A free agent's former team
may severely curtail interest in the player by making
unreasonable compensation demands, thereby forcing the
team seeking the player to either risk the unknown slings and
arrows of a Rule compensation or leave the player alone. At no
point in this process is any input received from the player. He
has "no hearing or opportunity to be heard." 3 In fact, the "free
agent player may not even be aware that other clubs are inter-
ested in him and are negotiating with the club to which he was
formerly under contract." 4 In the court's opinion, this denial
of an opportunity to be heard, secret bargaining for players
without their knowledge, and absence of safeguards to prevent
teams from using the Rule to nearly stop player movement
altogether, all make it an unreasonable restraint on trade and
an antitrust violation.
Third, the court found the restraint "unreasonable in that
it is unlimited in duration."55 The Rule follows a player wher-
ever he goes. He cannot avoid it by playing the option year and
totally completing his contract obligation to a team, nor may
he avoid it by staying out of the NFL altogether for a period of
time. 6 In considering the identical issue, the court in Kapp v.
National Football League stated that the effects of the rule
could be to "perpetually restrain a player from pursuing his
occupation among the clubs of a league that holds a virtual
52. Id., 6.2.2 at 9-10.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id., 6.2.3 at 10.
56. Joe Kapp, a plaintiff in another case attacking the player restrictions in the
NFL is an example. Kapp was drafted by Washington at the end of his college career
and could not come to terms with them. He then played seven years in Canada. On
his return to the NFL in 1967 with the Minnesota Vikings, the Vikings had to compen-
sate Washington. When Kapp left the Vikings and signed with the New England
Patriots in 1970, the Vikings were compensated. After Kapp refused to sign a standard
player's contract with the Patriots and left football, the Patriots kept him on their lists
in order to demand compensation should Kapp ever enter the NFL again.
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monopoly of professional football employment in the United
States."57 They further concluded
that such a rule imposing restraint virtually unlimited in
time and extent, goes far beyond any possible need for fair
protection of the interests of the club-employers or the pur-
poses of the NFL and that it imposes on the player employees
such undue hardship as to be an unreasonable restraint and
such rule is not susceptible of different inferences concerning
its reasonableness; it is unreasonable under any legal test.0
The Mackey court would fully agree.
Lastly, if the Rule standing alone is unreasonable, it is a
fortiori unreasonable when viewed in conjunction with the
other anticompetitive practices of the NFL mentioned above.
The second aspect of the court's rule of reason discussion
was a review of the arguments of the defendants designed to
show that the Rule, as used in the context of professional foot-
ball, is reasonable. Defendants initially claim that "one of the
purposes of the Rozelle Rule is to protect the member clubs
investment in established players" 9 and is therefore reason-
able. This investment is comprised of costs associated with, for
example, scouting of players and general player development.
In return for this investment, a team hopes to get a player that
can contribute to its championship aspirations.
Through the Rozelle Rule this investment is protected in
two ways. First, a team knows that since no player can sign
with another team without compensation being paid, the team
will recover part or all of its investment in a player through this
compensation. Second, the investment is further protected
because the probability that any player will leave a team at all
is decreased. In rejecting this argument, the court stated that
these expenses are not unlike those of other businesses which
have hiring and training costs. The NFL has "no right to com-
pensation for this type of investment,"" and, apparently, no
right to protect that investment through the use of burdensome
restrictions on player movement.
The second argument advanced by the NFL in support of
the reasonableness of the Rozelle Rule revolved around player
57. 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
58. Id.
59. Mackey, 1I 6.3.1 at 10.
60. Id.
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continuity." The NFL argued that in order for a football team
to be successful, its members must learn to work together. This
continuity requires time to develop and would be frustrated if
the team could not rely on having the same players each year.
If free movement of players were allowed, the quality of the
play in the NFL would suffer, the ticket buying public would
no longer respond, and players and teams alike would suffer.
The Rozelle Rule, the argument claimed, works to prevent this
deterioration and ought, therefore, to be recognized as reason-
able in the context of professional football.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court con-
cluded that "[t]he quality of play in the NFL will not decrease
with the elimination of the Rozelle Rule and consequent
freedom of employment."62 More significantly, the court also
concluded that even if "the quality of the play would decrease,
that fact does not justify the Rule's anticompetitive nature. '6 3
This second conclusion is particularly significant. It demon-
strates that if a balance needs to be struck between a player's
right to competitively sell his services and the league's interest
in maintaining high quality football, the player will win. If a
choice has to be made, the freedom of a player to sell his serv-
ices to the highest bidder will not be sacrificed to the mainte-
nance of quality football. In a practical sense, this conclusion
could have devastating effects.
The court recognized the possibility that it was factually
wrong and that the Rule actually does promote teamwork and
higher quality play by keeping players together. In that case,
the elimination of the Rule could have an effect on the quality
of the NFL's product. As quality deteriorates, revenue from
disenchanted fans could be expected to decline to the injury of
teams and players alike. Eventually, the existence of the league
itself could be threatened as salaries, pumped by competitive
bidding, increase and revenues decrease. The court concluded
that even if this scenario should come to pass, the right of a
football player to freely sell his services would take precedence
over continued existence of football as we know it. In some
respects it seems that the court has fixed the players' wagon
to a falling star. Legally, however, the court is bound to apply
61. Id., 1 6.3.2 at 10.
62. Id., 6.3.2.2 at 10.
63. Id.
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the law to the facts as it finds them. The court found that the
Rozelle Rule does not protect the quality of play and in that
factual context, its conclusion is justified.
The NFL's third defense of the Rule was related to the
second. The Rozelle Rule operates, it alleged, to maintain a
competitive balance. 4 The Rule keeps the very good players
from congregating on one team to the detriment of the rest of
the league and, ultimately, of the players themselves.
The court disagreed. It concluded that not only was main-
taining a competitive balance not sufficient justification for the
restrictions, but "that the existence of the Rozelle Rule and
other restrictive devices on players have not had any material
effect on competitive balance in the National Football
League." 5 This conclusion directly contradicts the conven-
tional wisdom on the subject of competitive balance, but it
may have substantial support in economic theory.
The economic theory of player restrictions was thoroughly
discussed in a recent article66 concerning player restrictions in
professional baseball. The theory is directly applicable to the
NFL rules and recognizes that professional major league sports
are businesses and as such should respond to the forces that
control their economic survival. Teams have an economic in-
terest in keeping games relatively close and thereby generating
fan interest. Lopsided games, without the element of uncer-
tainty, would attract fewer fans and decrease revenue. Thus,
buying up all the best talent in the league, and thereby insur-
ing lopsided games, is not in any team's best economic interest.
At some point, therefore, a strong team will pass.up a good
player and be willing to see him play for another team.
The economic theory also suggests that resources tend to
move toward their most highly valued uses. If a player is most
valuable to the team with his present contract, then no other
team will be able to bid him away. But, if the player is more
valuable to some other team, and if the transfer costs are small,
then the other team will bid the contract away from the
player's present team. These market forces would tend to keep
all the best players from congregating on one team, as at some
point, a third star player is of less value to Team A than a first
64. Id., 6.3.3 at 11.
65. Id.
66. Westerfield, Restrictive Labor Practices in Baseball: Time for a Change?,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS REVIEW, 1975.
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is to Team B. In such a situation, Team B gets the player.
Furthermore, systematized restrictions on player movement,
such as the Rozelle Rule and the player draft, are not equal to
the task of stopping movement in response to these pecuniary
considerations. Players constantly move from team to team
through trades. The article's conclusion was, therefore, that
sales and trades probably offset any leveling effects created by
the reserve system and the player drafts, and that "the distri-
bution of playing talent between rich and poor teams is not
affected by the reserve clause." 7 It may have been just such an
analysis, applied to football, that led the Mackey court to the
same general conclusion regarding the Rozelle Rule.
The Mackey court also concluded, however, that even if its
analysis was incorrect and the Rozelle Rule did foster competi-
tive balance, the illegality of the Rule would not change. If
some sort of restrictions were needed, the NFL would have to
substitute legal ones for the present illegal ones. The court
specifically mentioned Competition Committees, multiyear
contracts, and special incentives. With the artificial restriction
of the Rozelle Rule gone, NFL teams are presented with an
option. They can do nothing to restrict player movement and
must hope that the judge is right in finding that neither the
quality of play or competitive balance will be affected. In the
alternative, they can replace the Rule restraints with other
incentives calculated to keep players on their present teams
through free choice.
The fourth defense presented by the NFL to support the
reasonableness of the Rozelle Rule is that elimination of the
Rule would cause disruption and irreparable damage to the
league."6 This defense was apparently based on a fear that with-
out this weapon available to the NFL to deter players who seek
to play for other teams, the pent-up demand among players to
play elsewhere would cause a sudden and severe disruption in
the league as these players moved. Further disruptions would
occur each time a player became unhappy with his present
team and moved. The damage to the league would result either
through loss of continuity or by one or two teams accumulating
the best players.
The court concluded that these fears were without founda-
67. Id. at 21.
68. Mackey, 6.3.4 at 11.
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tion and that the "[elimination of the Rozelle Rule would
have no significant immediate disruptive effects on profes-
sional football.""9 This conclusion was based on the fact that
all players in the NFL are presently under contract to some
team and at any given time, only a few are playing in the option
year. Even if the Rozelle Rule were abolished tomorrow, pres-
ent contract duties of most players would preclude their mov-
ing to other teams. Thus there could be no "immediate" dis-
ruption. But the judge was not unaware that he may be causing
some fundamental changes in the present structure of the
game. He recognized that "changes in location of franchises or
reorganization of existing franchises may occur."70 The basic
conclusion of the court seems to be that professional football
has known since 195771 that it is subject to the antitrust laws
but it has chosen to structure itself in violation of those laws.
Since its development has been distorted by the existence of
antitrust violations, some modifications can be expected when
those practices are ended. Those changes are the price the NFL
will pay for its past antitrust transgressions. The court finally
suggested that "[i]f the effects of this decision prove to be too
damaging to professional football . . .Congress could possi-
bly grant special treatment to the National Football League
based upon its claimed unique status."72
In sum, the court considered the NFL's arguments concern-
ing the reasonableness of the Rozelle Rule and concluded it was
an unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce of football
players, and illegal.73 As noted above, the basis of the rule of
reason is the analysis of the good business reasons for engaging
in specified conduct and an evaluation of its effects on competi-
tion. The NFL presented four business reasons that it consid-
ered sufficient to justify the admitted restraint on player move-
ment. The court considered each one individually and con-
cluded that the justifications presented either did not exist
69. Id.
70. Id., 6.3.4.4 at 11.
71. The date of the Supreme Court's decision in Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
72. Mackey, 6.3.4.5 at 11. Congress has come to the aid of professional football
on at least two other occasions. In 1961, Congress allowed professional football teams
to pool their individual television rights for sale on a league basis to the networks. 15
U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). In 1966 that law was amended to allow merger of the National
Football League and the American Football League.
73. Mackey, 6.2 at 9.
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factually or were not a sufficient basis to mitigate what would
otherwise be a violation. To further support the conclusion, the
judge also found four separate reasons for concluding that the
rule is unreasonable in its application. Nor is the court's con-
clusion weakened because the court recognized that its conclu-
sions on player continuity and competitive balance may be
incorrect. While the rule of reason does allow some restraint,
whether a restraint is to be tolerated will depend to a substan-
tial degree on whether the restraint, in its operation, recognizes
"competition as the basic instrument of social control."74
Promotion of an interest "other than workable and effective
competition will not justify the restraint."75 The basic under-
pinning of the Rozelle Rule is clearly not a commitment to free
competition for services of players and thus even if the defenses
of the NFL were accepted, the antitrust result would probably
be the same.
Having exhausted its defenses of the Rule itself, the NFL
turned to two other defenses. The NFL argued that this case
should not have been heard by the court because the NFL was
protected from antitrust scrutiny by the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws.7" They also argued that primary and exclusive
jurisdiction of this dispute was properly in the National Labor
Relations Board. 77
The labor exemption was enacted to protect labor unions
from antitrust attack when legitimate labor union activities
resulted in ancilliary restraints of trade. The Supreme Court
found that the purpose behind the exemption was to clarify the
vulnerability of union activities to antitrust attack.78 The Court
concluded that the act had a two fold purpose: to make clear
that certain acts by businessmen were illegal, and that the
same or similar acts by unions were not illegal. Congress' inter-
est in passage was to reverse prior decisions7 that had held
unions subject to antitrust attack. The exemption was to
"accommodate the coverage of the Sherman act to the policy
74. 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 45 (1973).
75. Id.
76. Mackey, 7 at 11.
77. Id., 8 at 15.
78. Allen Bradley v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325
U.S. 797 (1945).
79. E.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
[Vol. 59
RECENT DECISIONS
of the labor laws."8 It was not designed to protect employers
from similar attacks.
All union activity, however, has never been exempt from
such antitrust attack. If the Rozelle Rule is to be found to be
union activity, and therefore exempt, it must be shown that the
union was engaged in "arms-length bargaining in pursuit of
their own labor union policies." 8' The union must be acting in
its own self interest. Without any consideration of these cases,
the Mackey court concluded that as applied to the facts of this
case, the exemption was not available.82
The court initially noted that "[t]he Rozelle Rule is not,
and has not been considered by the union to be in the players'
best interests." 3 The interests of the players are clearly to rid
themselves of the restriction that denies them the freedom to
sell their services in a free and open market. The restraint
could, however, be in the players' best interest if, in open bar-
gaining, the restraint had been accepted in exchange for some-
thing else that the players sought that was in their best inter-
est. The court held that such an exchange had not taken place.
In reviewing the history of the collective bargaining at-
tempts between the players and the league, the court found
that in none of the two bargaining agreements entered into by
the National Football League Players' Association and the
NFL "was there any trade off or quid pro quo whereby the
union agreed to the Rozelle Rule in return for other benefits."' 4
There has never been anything that "could be legitimately
characterized as 'bargaining' between the parties with respect
to the Rozelle Rule." ' It was the defendants' position through-
out the negotiations that led to the 1970 bargaining agreement
that the Commissioner's powers, including the Rozelle Rule,
"could not be touched and were non-negotiable."'" The inabil-
ity of the players to end or even modify the Rule in their
negotiations was attributed to the weakness on the part of the
players vis-a-vis the league due to the newness of the players'
association, the power of the league, dissension among the
80. Meat Cutters Local Union 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
81. Id. at 690.
82. Mackey, 7.1 at 11.
83. Id., 7.5 at 11.
84. Id., 7.7 at 12.
85. Id., 7.9 at 12.
86. Id., 7.9.6 at 13.
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players, inadequate financing, and communication problems.87
Thus the ultimate conclusion of the court is that the "Rozelle
Rule has never been the subject of serious, intensive, arms-
length collective bargaining"88 and that it has been "unilater-
ally imposed by the NFL and member club[s]"89 on the play-
ers since 1963. As a result, the Rule cannot be considered bar-
gained for, is not in the players' best interest, and no labor
exemption is available."
The last defense of the NFL was that this dispute is within
either the exclusive or primary jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. These jurisdictional issues arise when
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency conflicts with that
of a court seeking to make an antitrust determination. The
conflict can be resolved in one of three different ways. The
court may invoke the concept of exclusive jurisdiction and dis-
miss the antitrust action when the court finds that "it has been
totally ousted of jursidiction because Congress, in enacting the
regulatory statute, intended to override the fundamental na-
tional policies embodied in the antitrust laws."9 The courts
have rarely found such implied repeals of the antitrust laws
and the Mackey court flatly concluded that "[tihe National
Labor Relations Board does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this lawsuit." 2
A second way of resolving jurisdictional conflict is the re-
lated concept of primary jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, the
court is not stripped of jurisdiction. Instead, the antitrust
proceeding is stayed pending agency consideration when such
consideration would be of material assistance to the court in
deciding the antitrust issues." The Mackey court concluded
that no such agency consideration was needed, probably be-
cause it believed that the issues involved in this case were not
within the particular expertise of the Board. The court also
noted that "[t]he doctrine of exclusive primary National
87. Id., 7.10.1, 7.10.2, 7.10.5 at 13-14.
88. Id., 7.12 at 14.
89. Id.
90. Virtually identical reasoning was presented in two other cases that considered
the issues of player restrictions in professional sports. Robertson v. National Basketball
Association, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
91. 16F J. VON KALNOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION 44A-10 (1975)
citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
92. Mackey, 8.1 at 15.
93. 16F J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION 44A-10 (1975).
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Labor Relations Board jurisdiction has never been applied by
the Supreme Court to avoid a determination on the merits of
an antitrust claim."94 Having disposed of both jurisdictional
claims of the NFL, the court opted for the third resolution to
the apparent conflict and asserted its own jurisdiction.
After concluding that the NFL Rozelle Rule was a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, that it violated the rule of reason
and that the NFL's defenses to the application of the antitrust
laws were without merit, the court stated that the Rule is
"hereby declared to be in violation of the antitrust laws" and
that all defendants are "permanently restrained and enjoined
• . . from continuing, attempting to continue or otherwise en-
forcing the Rozelle Rule against plaintiffs. 9 5 Judgment was
"stayed pending appeal or until further Order of the Court."96
Although the court found the Rozelle Rule a violation of
antitrust law, illegal and unenforceable, other anticompetitive
practices of the defendants, identified by the court for contex-
tual purposes, were left unchallenged and untouched. This de-
cision seems to have some strong implications for them also.
The player draft is a classic example of a group boycott in the
FOGA-Kior's mold. The rule that no player is even eligible for
the draft until his college class graduates has already fallen in
the National Basketball Association97 and the comparable NFL
rule is stricter than its NBA counterpart. 8 The basic draft itself
is a clear group boycott. The NFL teams, holders of a monopoly
over professional football in the United States, have agreed in
concert that no team will deal with a player under any circum-
stances if another team has drafted that player. This case may
also make the option clause, contained in the mandatory stan-
dard player contract, more vulnerable to attack. While the
clause has been upheld in one case, " later cases have indicated
that it may have lost its favor because it is a part of the web of
anticompetitive player restrictions. ' The tampering rule de-
94. Mackey, 8.2.1 at 15.
95. Mackey, 10.3 at 15.
96. Id., 10.6 at 16.
97. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
98. NFL Constitution and By-Laws, 1975, § 12.1.
99. Dallas Cowboys Football Club v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
100. Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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nies a player the right to seek competitive bids for his services
until up to four and a half months after the end of any contract
duties he has to any team. Such a restriction under the reason-
ing of this case is clearly subject to attack as an unreasonable
restraint of competition. Thus, the whole system developed by
the NFL to force players to remain with the teams to which
they are presently under contract appears about to crumble.
Nor should we expect the effect of decisions such as the one
made by the Minnesota court to be restricted to football only.
Similar rules have been subject to attack in basketball, hockey,
and other big business sports. Only baseball seems immune.
The long term effects of the fall of these rules is difficult to
predict. While the court is probably correct in concluding that
the immediate effects will be minimal, it will be interesting to
see what forces determine player salaries and benefits when
free competition reigns. Under the present conditions, a player
and team are forced bedfellows, largely unable to deal with
others. When such forced relations are gone, it would seem that
the general salary level would increase for players good enough
to have bargaining power with two teams. Perhaps warm
weather cities would be able to sign good players for less than
northern cities. Perhaps teams with harsh coaches would have
to pay more than teams with likeable coaches. Perhaps teams
with winning traditions would have to pay less than losers.
Perhaps teams with either artificial or real turf would have a
bargaining advantage depending on what the players like.
Teams located in cities with more to offer socially, culturally,
or recreationally may have an advantage. Perhaps player conti-
nuity would even be increased as several players who played
together in college seek employment on the same professional
team. Maybe interest would increase as local athletes could
play college and professional ball in the same area.
What will actually come of all this remains to be seen. The
optimal solution would be to have the players and the NFL
agree to some compromise while the order of judgment is
stayed. The bargaining strength of the players, a concern of the
court in player-team negotiations, has been substantially in-
creased. The conduct of both parties will be most interesting
pending an outcome of the appeals.
JOHN T. WHITING
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